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Airport fever screening in Taiwan, July 2003–June
2004, identified 40 confirmed dengue cases. Results
obtained by capture immunoglobulin (Ig) M and IgG
enzyme-linked immunoassay, real time 1-step polymerase
chain reaction, and virus isolation showed that 33 (82.5%)
of 40 patients were viremic. Airport fever screening can
thus quickly identify imported dengue cases. 
D
engue viruses are arboviruses that cause substantial
human disease in tropical and subtropical regions of
the world, especially in urban and semiurban areas.
Because of its high endemicity in many countries in the
Western Pacific, Southeast Asia, and South American
regions, dengue has become an important public health
problem in most nations in these areas (1). Dengue is not
considered endemic in Taiwan, however, and the constant
importation of dengue viruses from the neighboring
Southeast Asian countries through close commercial links
and air travel is believed to cause local outbreaks (2,3).
Until now, local outbreaks, which are most frequent in the
summer and fall, have each been caused by a single
imported dengue virus strain that disappears when each
outbreak ends. Because waves of relatively cold tempera-
ture of ≈10°C cause low mosquito density in winter, win-
ter outbreaks are rare, with the exceptions of large
outbreaks in 1915–1916, 1942–1943, 1987–1988, and
2001–2002. Outbreaks occur mainly in southern Taiwan,
where Aedes aegypti and A. albopictus coexist, and rarely
occur in central and northern Taiwan, where only A.
albopictus exist. The dengue hemorrhagic fever cases in
Taiwan are highly correlated with increasing age and sec-
ondary dengue virus infection (4; J-H Huang, unpub data).
The Study
To identify imported dengue cases and reduce the local
spread of newly introduced dengue viruses, the health
authority, now Center for Disease Control, Taiwan, has
established an integrated dengue control program that
includes various surveillance systems, a network of rapid
diagnostic laboratories, and mechanisms of rapid response
to implement control measures (3). The primary objective
is to prevent the introduction of new dengue viruses into
Taiwan by travel and subsequent local spread. Dengue is
classified as a reportable infectious disease, and suspected
cases must be reported within 24 hours of clinical diagno-
sis in Taiwan. For effective surveillance, both passive
(hospital-based reporting system) and active (such as
health statement of inbound passengers, self-report,
expanded screening for contacts of confirmed cases,
patients with fever of unknown origin, school-based
reporting, community screening) surveillance systems
were established in central and local health departments. 
For rapid diagnosis, 2 central dengue diagnostic labora-
tories were set up in Center for Disease Control–Taiwan, at
Kun-Yan Laboratory in northern Taiwan and at a fourth
branch laboratory in southern Taiwan. Serum samples from
suspected dengue patients were sent to the diagnostic labo-
ratories, and the results were reported within 24 to 48
hours. To avoid delays, the laboratory was scheduled to per-
form the tests on a daily basis without vacations. A rapid
diagnostic system was developed to detect and differentiate
various flavivirus infections on the basis of the results of 1-
step real-time polymerase chain reaction (PCR) and enve-
lope membrane (E/M)–specific capture immunoglobulin
(Ig) M and IgG enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay
(ELISA) (5–7). Analysis of a total of 959 acute- and conva-
lescent-phase serum specimens from 799 confirmed
dengue patients showed that 95% of acute-phase serum
specimens could be identified as being from confirmed or
probable case-patients based on these 2 assays (8).
In 2003, Taiwan was one of the countries heavily
affected by the multinational epidemics of severe acute
respiratory syndrome (SARS) (9). During the SARS epi-
demic, the body temperature of all inbound and outbound
passengers at the 2 international airports was screened to
prevent international spread of SARS. Since July 14, 2003,
all inbound passengers have been required to complete the
“SARS Survey Form” before landing and to have their
body temperature taken by an infrared thermal camera.
Any passenger showing body temperature >37°C is
rechecked by ear temperature, and serum samples are col-
lected and sent for SARS diagnosis if the ear temperature
is >37.5°C. After July 5, 2003, the world was largely con-
sidered to be SARS free, and other causes of fever had to
be considered; therefore, a panel of diagnostic tests,
including tests for pathogens of dengue, malaria, enteric
bacteria, and other diseases (such as yellow fever, plague),
was performed for selected fever patients. Since dengue
fever is among the top yearly imported reportable diseases
in Taiwan, we began a trial fever screening program for
dengue along with SARS screening at the airports. 
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China We report our findings on early identification of dengue
fever through fever screening at the 2 international air-
ports, C.K.S. and Kaohsiung Airports, Taiwan. More than
8,000,000 inbound travelers passed through the 2 airports
from July 2003 to June 2004. Among these, ≈22,000 pas-
sengers were identified as fever patients by an infrared
thermal camera and rechecked by ear temperature.
Diagnostic testing algorithms for screened fever patients
were based on evaluation by airport clinicians. After clini-
cal diagnosis, 3,011 serum samples were sent for laborato-
ry diagnosis of dengue virus infection. Forty (1.33%) of
3,011 serum samples were confirmed to be positive on the
basis of the results of real-time PCR and E/M-specific cap-
ture IgM and IgG ELISA. During the same period, 6,005
dengue cases were reported in Taiwan (both indigenous
and imported cases), which includes 935 cases from the
passive surveillance system and 5,070 cases from active
surveillance systems (3,011 fever patients were identified
by fever screening and 2,059 cases were identified from
other systems). Among these, 73 were confirmed to be
imported dengue cases, including 25 cases reported from
hospitals through passive surveillance and 48 cases identi-
fied by active surveillance, such as airport screening and
self-report by patients. Airport fever screening alone iden-
tified 40 (83.3%) of 48 of all imported cases identified by
the active surveillance system. Thus, 8 imported cases
were identified by other active surveillance methods. The
average length between the onsets of dengue symptoms to
the time of diagnosis was 4.15 days for the 40 case-
patients who were identified at the airport, as opposed to
11 days for those who were reported from the hospital.
Whether the shorter length required to diagnose conditions
identified by airport fever screening contributed to the low
indigenous dengue in the season warrants further investi-
gation. 
Fever screening at the airports has also dramatically
increased the proportion of imported dengue cases identi-
fied by active surveillance, 48 (65.8%), of 73 which is sig-
nificantly higher than the number identified during years
before fever screening were implemented (p < 0.0001 by
chi-square test) (Table 1). The countries of origin of
imported dengue fever from July 2003 to June 2004 were
all located in the Western Pacific and Southeast Asia
(Table 2). The distribution of the countries of origin accu-
rately reflected the frequency of air travel between Taiwan
and these nations, as well as the intensity of massive
dengue outbreaks during the same period in the country of
origin. Analyses of dengue virus serotypes showed that
various serotypes were circulating in each of these coun-
tries during this period. 
Most of the confirmed cases (33 of 40) identified by
airport fever screening were viremic (real-time PCR posi-
tive, IgM and IgG negative). The other 7 case-patients test-
ed positive for dengue-specific IgM or IgG antibody,
although they were febrile at the time of testing (data not
shown). Estimating how many patients might have been
viremic but were not picked up by the system is difficult,
since persons infected with dengue virus are usually
viremic from 2 to 3 days before onset of symptoms until
defervescence. 
Conclusions
Our results demonstrated that fever screening at air-
ports is an effective means of identifying imported dengue
cases, whereas the health statements of inbound passen-
gers, which have been required for years, are ineffective.
Although fever screening with infrared temperature
screening was implemented in an attempt to avoid SARS
transmission, it proved to be effective in active surveil-
lance of dengue. This approach seems promising for
dengue and perhaps for other diseases and should be fur-
ther evaluated. 
The cost of identifying dengue virus infections with air-
port fever screening is similar to that of other surveillance
methods. The airport fever screening method requires an
infrared thermal camera, which costs approximately U.S.
$43,000 for each set of instruments. In addition, 1 addi-
tional worker is needed to monitor this alarm system. The
reporting procedure and clinical and laboratory diagnoses
are similar to those of surveillance methods. Therefore, the
method is a cost-effective means of identifying imported
dengue cases. 
Although febrile passengers suspected of having
dengue virus infection were not detained at the airport, and
an epidemiologic investigation was not conducted, they
were provided with a mosquito net to avoid mosquito bites
and instructed to report to the local health department if
they felt ill. Laboratory diagnoses were performed on a
Fever Screening at Airports and Imported Dengue
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hours. Control measures were implemented as soon as pos-
sible if probable or confirmed dengue cases were identi-
fied. Since viremic persons, going about their normal
activities for a mean interval of 2 to 3 days before diagno-
sis, could have transmitted dengue, the laboratory detec-
tion method on its own will not be effective in preventing
transmission. Therefore, developing an integrated program
that includes various surveillance systems, rapid diagnos-
tic laboratories, and emergency control measures is neces-
sary to prevent the introduction and spread of new dengue
viruses into a region. Control measures should consist of
epidemiologic investigation, health education, analysis of
mosquito density, source reduction, and insecticide appli-
cation. As part of an integrated dengue control program,
fever screening at the airport has become one of the most
important active surveillance systems in Taiwan since its
introduction in July 2003. We believed that this active sur-
veillance system could also be successfully applied to
screen febrile patients and reduce the introduction of many
potential infectious diseases.
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